publications

working papers

  1. M2
    Mechanism Design with Outliers and Predictions
    Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer, and Artem Tsikiridis
    2025
  2. M1
    Tight Liquid Welfare Guarantees for Auctions with Budgets via LP Duality
    Twan Kroll, Guido Schäfer, and Artem Tsikiridis

journal publications

  1. J4
    Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions
    Georgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Christodoulos Santorinaios, Guido Schäfer, Panagiotis Tsamopoulos, and Artem Tsikiridis
    Theoretical Computer Science, 2026
    Supersedes the SAGT 2025 paper.
  2. J3
    Pandora’s Box Problem with Time Constraints
    Georgios Amanatidis, Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, and Artem Tsikiridis
    Artificial Intelligence, 2025
    Talk at the Dutch Seminar on Optimization. Supersedes the WINE 2024 paper and this AAAI 2024 paper of Ben, Federico, Michal and Tomer.
  3. J2
    Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents
    Georgios Amanatidis, Sophie Klumper, Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer, and Artem Tsikiridis
    ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2025
    Supersedes the WINE 2023 paper. Appeared as a poster at the SLMath workshop on Algorithms, Approximation and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design and at WALE 2024.
  4. J1
    Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction
    Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis, Orestis Telelis, and Artem Tsikiridis
    Theory of Computing Systems, 2019
    Supersedes the SAGT 2017 paper. Appeared as a poster at the Workshop for the 20 years of the Price of Anarchy, 20POA 2019.

conference publications

  1. C11
    On the Convergence of First-Order Methods in Signaling Games
    Martin Bichler, Rilind Sahitaj, and Artem Tsikiridis
    In 40th Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS), 2026
  2. C10
    Breaking Barriers, Finding Boundaries: Not Obviously Manipulable Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design
    Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis, and Carmine Ventre
    In 40th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2026
  3. C9
    Optimal Type-Dependent Liquid Welfare Guarantees for Autobidding Agents with Budgets
    Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Twan Kroll, Stefano Leonardi, Guido Schäfer, and Artem Tsikiridis
    In 37th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2026
    Poster at ALGA 25.
  4. C8
    Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions
    Georgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Christodoulos Santorinaios, Guido Schäfer, Panagiotis Tsamopoulos, and Artem Tsikiridis
    In 18th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2025
    Superseded by the TCS 2026 paper.
  5. C7
    Pandora’s Box Problem Over Time
    Georgios Amanatidis, Federico Fusco, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, and Artem Tsikiridis
    In 20th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2024
    Talk at the Dutch Seminar on Optimization. Superseded by the Artificial Intelligence paper.
  6. C6
    To Trust or Not to Trust: Assignment Mechanisms with Predictions in the Private Graph Model
    Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer, and Artem Tsikiridis
    In 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2024
    Talk at EC24. Appeared as a poster at the (virtual) 9th Marketplace Innovation Workshop.
  7. C5
    Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents
    Georgios Amanatidis, Sophie Klumper, Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer, and Artem Tsikiridis
    In 19th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2023
    Superseded by the TEAC 2025 paper.
  8. C4
    On Improved Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Markets
    Evangelos Markakis, Georgios Papasotiropoulos, and Artem Tsikiridis
    In 15th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2022
  9. C3
    Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction
    Evangelos Markakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa, and Artem Tsikiridis
    In 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2021
    Talk at WINE21.
  10. C2
    On Core-Selecting and Core-Competitive Mechanisms for Binary Single-Parameter Auctions
    Evangelos Markakis and Artem Tsikiridis
    In 15th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2019
    Talk at WINE19 (2:15:00).
  11. C1
    Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction
    Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis, Orestis Telelis, and Artem Tsikiridis
    In 10th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2017
    Superseded by the TOCS 2019 paper.

theses

  1. D2
    Design and Analysis of Auction Mechanisms: Algorithms and Incentives
    Artem Tsikiridis
    Athens University of Economics and Business, 2023
    Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Vangelis Markakis
  2. D1
    Multi-unit Auctions: Equilibria and Inefficiency
    Artem Tsikiridis
    Athens University of Economics and Business, 2017
    Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Vangelis Markakis

other

  1. W1
    Integrating Clinical Data from Hospital Databases
    Kostis Karozos, Iosif Spartalis, Artem Tsikiridis, Despoina Trivela, and Vasilis Vassalos
    In 1st International Workshop on Semantic Web Technologies for Health Data Management (SWH@ISWC), 2018