Artem Tsikiridis
Postdoctoral Researcher, Technical University of Munich.
artem.tsikiridis@tum.de
Boltzmannstr. 3
85748 Munich, Germany
Welcome! I am a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Computer Science of the Technical University of Munich. I am hosted by Martin Bichler at the Chair of Decision Sciences & Systems.
Before this, I was a postdoc for two wonderful years at the Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI) in Amsterdam, hosted by Guido Schäfer in the Networks & Optimization (N&O) group. I completed my PhD in 2023 at the Department of Informatics of the Athens University of Economics and Business, where I was very fortunate to be advised by Vangelis Markakis.
I enjoy working on problems at the intersection of computer science and economics, with a particular interest in algorithmic mechanism design, auctions, and online algorithms.
Program Committees: EC (25), WINE (24-25), WebConf/WWW (26), AAAI (26), IJCAI (25), AAMAS (25-26), ECAI (24-25), SAGT (23, 25)
Journal Reviewer: Naval Research Logistics (25), Theoretical Computer Science (23, 24, 25), JAAMAS (25)
Subreviewer: STOC (25), SODA (26), EC (20, 22, 24) WINE (17–21) ITCS (20), ICALP (17, 19, 25), AAMAS (18,24), SAGT (22, 24) STACS (24), MFCS (25), SOSA (25)
news
| Oct 03, 2025 | Our paper with Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Twan Kroll, Stefano Leonardi and Guido Schäfer, Optimal Type-Dependent Liquid Welfare Guarantees for Autobidding Agents with Budgets, has been accepted to SODA 2026! |
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| Sep 27, 2025 | Our paper with Georgios Amanatidis, Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, and Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, Pandora’s Box Problem with Time Constraints, has been accepted to Artificial Intelligence (AIJ)! This work extends the results of our WINE 2024 paper with Federico, Georgios, and Rebecca, as well as this AAAI 2024 paper by Ben, Federico, Michal, and Tomer. |
| Sep 01, 2025 | I have started a new position as a postdoctoral researcher in the department of Computer Science at the Technical University of Munich, working with Martin Bichler. Very excited! |
| Jul 02, 2025 | Our paper with Georgios Amanatidis, Vangelis Markakis, Christodoulos Santorinaios, Guido Schäfer and Panagiotis Tsamopoulos Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions has been accepted to SAGT 2025! |
| Mar 02, 2025 | I gave a talk at the Combinatorial Optimization Seminar of TU Eindhoven. |
| Mar 01, 2025 | Our paper with Georgios Amanatidis, Sophie Klumper, Evangelos Markakis and Guido Schäfer Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents has been accepted to ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation! |
| Dec 14, 2024 | I am in the program committee of EC 2025. |
| Nov 18, 2024 | I gave a talk at the Dutch Seminar on Optimization on our upcoming WINE paper. You can watch the video here. |
| Sep 17, 2024 | Our paper with Georgios Amanatidis, Federico Fusco and Rebecca Reiffenhäuser Pandora’s Box Problem Over Time has been accepted to WINE 2024! |
| Jul 16, 2024 | I am in the Program Committees of WINE 2024 and AAMAS 2025. |
research
working papers
| 2. | Mechanism Design with Outliers and Predictions with A. Deligkas, E. Eiben, S. Klumper, and G. Schäfer [arXiv version] |
| 1. | The Effectiveness of Golden Tickets and Wooden Spoons for Budget-Feasible Mechanisms with B. de Keijzer, G. Schäfer, and C. Ventre [arXiv version] |
journal publications
| 3. | Pandora’s Box Problem with Time Constraints with G. Amanatidis, B. Berger, T. Ezra, M. Feldman, F. Fusco, and R. Reiffenhäuser Artificial Intelligence, to appear [arXiv version] [talk at Dutch Seminar on Optimization] Supersedes the WINE 2024 paper below and this AAAI 2024 paper of Ben, Federico, Michal and Tomer. |
| 2. | Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents with G. Amanatidis, S. Klumper, E. Markakis, and G. Schäfer ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 13, pp. 1-28, 2025 [arXiv version] Supersedes the WINE 2023 paper below. Appeared as a poster at the SLMath workshop on Algorithms, Approximation and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design and at WALE 2024. |
| 1. | Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction with G. Birmpas, G. Markakis, and O. Telelis Theory of Computing Systems, Vol. 63, pp. 1451-1469, 2019 [pdf] Supersedes the SAGT 2017 paper below. Appeared as a poster at the Workshop for the 20 years of the Price of Anarchy, 20POA 2019. |
conference publications
| 9. | Optimal Type-Dependent Liquid Welfare Guarantees for Autobidding Agents with Budgets with R. Colini-Baldeschi, S. Klumper, T. Kroll, S. Leonardi and G. Schäfer SODA 2026, 37th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms [arXiv version] [poster at ALGA 25] |
| 8. | Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions with G. Amanatidis, E. Markakis, C. Santorinaios, G. Schäfer and P. Tsamopoulos SAGT 2025, 18th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory [arXiv version] |
| 7. | Pandora's Box Problem Over Time with G Amanatidis, F. Fusco, and R. Reiffenhäuser WINE 2024, 20th Conference on Web and Internet Economics [arXiv version] [talk at Dutch Seminar on Optimization] Superseded by the Artificial Intelligence paper above. |
| 6. | To Trust or Not to Trust: Assignment Mechanisms with Predictions in the Private Graph Model with R. Colini-Baldeschi, S. Klumper, and G. Schäfer EC 2024, 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation [arXiv version] [talk at EC24] Appeared as a poster at the (virtual) 9th Marketplace Innovation Workshop. |
| 5. | Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents with G. Amanatidis, S. Klumper, E. Markakis, and G. Schäfer WINE 2023, 19th Conference on Web and Internet Economics [arXiv version] Superseded by the TEAC 25 paper above. |
| 4. | On Improved Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Markets with E. Markakis, and G. Papasotiropoulos SAGT 2022, 15th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory [pdf] |
| 3. | Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction with E. Markakis, and A. Sgouritsa WINE 2021, 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics [pdf] [ talk at WINE21] |
| 2. | On Core-Selecting and Core-Competitive Mechanisms for Binary Single-Parameter Auctions with E. Markakis WINE 2019, 15th Conference on Web and Internet Economics [pdf] [talk at WINE19 (2:15:00)] |
| 1. | Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction with G. Birmpas, E. Markakis, and O. Telelis SAGT 2017, 10th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory Best Paper Award [link] Superseded by the TOCS 2019 paper above. |
theses
| 2. | Design and Analysis of Auction Mechanisms: Algorithms and Incentives PhD Thesis, Athens University of Economics and Business, April 2023 Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Vangelis Markakis [thesis] |
| 1. | Multi-unit Auctions: Equilibria and Inefficiency MSc Thesis, Athens University of Economics and Business, July 2017 Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Vangelis Markakis [thesis] |
other
| 1. | Integrating Clinical Data from Hospital Databases with K. Karozos, I. Spartalis, D. Trivela, and V. Vassalos SWH@ISWC 2018, 1st International Workshop on Semantic Web Technologies for Health Data Management [pdf] |